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The initial impetus for the formation of ASEM came principally from economic factors as global 
restructuring and new developments in regionalization occurred following the end of the Cold War. 
From the time it came into being, however, ASEM’s agenda has been much broader, including as it 
does both political and cultural pillars as well as an economic one. And although economic factors do 
contribute to identity formation, it is largely within the context of political and cultural considerations 
that questions of identity have arisen. These include (although are by no means limited to) two issues. 
First, there is the issue of who is included in the formal membership of the meeting process and all its 
attendant activities – and who is excluded. Second, there is the recurring theme of human rights which 
the European Union has made a centrepiece of its Common Foreign and Security Policy, and which has 
therefore become part and parcel of its identity as an international actor. The purpose of this paper is to 




The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) process emerged as part of broader developments in regionalization 
that  picked up pace in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War and which have since been seen as an 
important element in the development of contemporary international order.1 One of the major factors 
identified by commentators on the emergence of ASEM was the apparent realization, on the part of 
actors in both Europe and the Asian region, that the post-Cold War economic order was dominated 
largely by forms of regional association linked directly to the US. In the early 1990s, relations between 
Europe and the US were well-established, as were relations between Asia and the US. But apart from 
an EU-ASEAN link – formally established in 1980 and strengthened in 1994 by the EU’s participation 
in the first ASEAN Regional Forum– as well as a network of bilateral arrangements and activities, 
there was nothing in the way in the way of a formal system of inter-regional linkages between Europe 
and Asia. 2  The third side of the economic triangle comprising North America, Asia and Europe was 
therefore regarded as comparatively weak.3 Described by Singaporean Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong 
as the ‘missing link’ in a tri-polar world, with poor channels of communication, the relationship 
between Europe and Asia was one that clearly needed strengthening in a globalizing world.4 
 
                                                           
1 See Joachim Krause, ‘Overview’ in CAEC Task Force, Strengthening International Order: The Role of Asia-
Europe Cooperation, Tokyo and London, Council for Asia-Europe Cooperation, 2000, p. 3. 
2 François Heisburg in Hans Maull, Gerald Segal and Jusuf Wanandi, Europe and the Asia-Pacific, London, 
Routledge, 1998, p. 231. 
3 Hilary Synnot, ‘The Second Asia-Europe Summit and the ASEM Process’, Asian Affairs, vol. 30, issue 1, Feb. 
1999, p. 1 of 7 of online version. See also Chungly Lee and Ya-Chung Chang, ‘A Strategic Analysis of Asia-
Europe Relations’ in Chungly Lee (ed.), Asia-Europe Cooperation After the 1997-1998 Asian Turbulence, 
Burlington (Vermont), Ashgate, 2000, p. 149. 
4 Goh Chok Tong, ‘Europe –Asia Partnership for Growth, in Singapore Ministry for Informationa and the Arts, 
Speeches, vol. 19, no. 1, Jan-Feb 1995, pp. 18-19. 
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On the European side, there was a rather belated recognition that Asia was now a significant 
locus of economic power. And since the EU had been excluded from the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) forum, it was feeling somewhat isolated.5  This led in the first instance to the 
commissioning of a report on a ‘new Asia strategy’. The opening lines of this report, which was 
presented to the European Parliament and the European Council in 1995, framed the strategy in terms 
of the economic opportunities that should be grasped by Europe (as represented by the EU) without 
further delay: 
 
The rise of Asia is dramatically changing the world balance of economic power.The World 
Bank estimates that half of the growth in the global economy will ensure that, by the year 2000, one 
billion Asians will have significant consumer spending power and, of these, 400 million will have 
average disposable incomes as high, if not higher, than their European or US contemporaries. 6 
 
Just three months after the release of this document, the initiative was seized by Singapore’s 
Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong, who proposed a summit meeting in Bangkok, and it is largely through 
Singaporean international activism that the other members of ASEAN7, as well as Japan, China and 
South Korea, were persuaded to support the project. At this stage, it was to some extent within the 
power of key ASEAN countries to define the ‘Asia’ that would initially participate, although this 
would always be mediated by what the EU would consider acceptable. On the European side, there was 
some hesitation and even hostility to the whole idea (from German Chancellor Helmut Kohl) but with 
increasing pressure from business leaders as well as other political figures in Europe the proposal for a 
summit was accepted in principle by the EU in 1995.8 The first ASEM summit was subsequently held 
in March 1996 – a quite remarkable feat of organization for a meeting involving almost all 25 heads of 
government of the participating states as well as the President of the European Commission. 
 
Initially, the whole ASEM idea seemed to have been driven almost exclusively by economic 
considerations on both sides of the partnership. As one commenator remarked at the time: 
 
Europe and Asia’s ‘rediscovery’ of each other is driven by the necessity of economics. Asia’s entry as 
a major economic player in the international market is a central reality that Europe cannot ignore. 
Impressed by Asia’s growing economic clout, and the economic opportunities that abound, Europe 
realised that its own prosperity required an engagement with Asia. Asia, faced with huge infrastructural 
and capital needs, is also eager to attract European investments and technology.9 
 
                                                           
5 Paul Lim, ‘The Unfolding Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Process’ in Peter W. Preston and Julie Gilson (eds), 
The European Union and East Asia: Interregional Linkages in a Changing Global System, Cheltenham, Edward 
Elgar, 2001, p. 91. 
6 European Union, Towards a New Asia Strategy, COM (94) 314, p. 1. 
7 Which at the time did not include Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. 
8 David Camroux and Christian Lechervy, ‘”Close Encounters of a Third Kind?” The Inaugural Asia-Europe 
Meeting of March 1996’, The Pacific Review, vol. 9, no. 3, p. 443. 
9 Yeo Lay Hwee, ‘A Foundation for Asia-Europe Ties’, Business Times (Singapore), 25-26 May 1996 ‘ISEAS 
Trends’ insert, p. 1. 
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 The inaugural Bangkok meeting apparently produced much goodwill and an enthusiasm for 
further development of the ASEM process, with the leaders committing themselves to several 
generalities: ‘to develop a common vision of the future, to foster political dialogue, to reinforce 
economic cooperation, and to promote cooperation in other areas.’10  Vague as these may seem, the 
willingness to engage in a ‘political dialogue’ was significant, for it moved the process well beyond the 
straightforward economic realm into areas of sensitivity usually avoided by at least some key countries 
in the Asian region. It has been remarked that the inclusion of political dialogue is in fact one of 
ASEM’s strengths compared with other regional groupings such as APEC which has none.11  
 
Another idea to emerge from the Bangkok meeting, and again initiated by Singapore, was an 
Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF) to ‘promote better mutual understanding between the peoples of Asia 
and Europe through greater intellectual, cultural and people-to-people exchanges between the two 
regions.’12 Based in Singapore and funded by ASEM members as well as by donations from the 
corporate sector, ASEF has generated a significant range of activities since it was founded in February 
1997. A recent report stated that ASEF had completed over 120 activities including conventions and 
symposia, public lectures, youth camps, art competitions, performances and exhibitions. Some of the 
activities planned for the near future include the Sixth Asia-Europe Young Leaders Symposium, an 
Asia-Europe Puppet Festival, an Asia-Europe Film Development Plan, ‘Hamlet’ – an Asia-Europe 
Performing Arts Experience, a Second Asia-Europe Classroom (AEC) International Teachers’ 
Conference and an Asia-Europe Dialogue on ‘A Gender Agenda’.13 Although the ASEF approach to 
the ‘culture’ concept is understood largely in terms of  ‘heritage’,14 some attention has been paid to 
political aspects of ‘cultural values’ in the context of human rights issues, although ‘cautious’ is the 
term which best describes the approach. For example, several ‘informal’ symposia have been held on 
human rights and although they have been supported by ASEF they are not considered to be an official 
ASEM activity.15 This to some extent cushions the political implications. 
 
Since Bangkok, the ASEM summits have become a biennial event, meeting in London in 
1998 and in Seoul in 2000 with a fourth meeting scheduled to take place in Copenhagen in September 
2002.  In addition to the formal summit meetings, the ASEM process has spawned a huge number of 
sideshows. These include meetings of Foreign Ministers on three occasions with Senior Officials 
Meetings (SOMs) now usually held twice yearly; a similar number of Finance Ministers’ meetings as 
well as separate meetings of Economics Ministers along with an additional series of Senior Officials’ 
                                                           
10 ‘ The Asia-Europe Cooperation Framework (AECF) 2000: III Key Principles and Objectives’, EU External 
Relations website, htttp://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/asem/asem_process/aecf_ 
2000.htm, downloaded 16/06/02, p. 2 of 6. 
11 Robin Hart, ‘Improving the Asia-Europe Relationship’, IIAS Newsletter, no. 14, internet version at 
http://iias.leidenuniv.nl/kreeft/newsletter14/General/14baxa02.html downloaded 13/11/0, p. 2 of 3. 
12 Asia-Europe Foundation website,  http://www.asef.org/about_principles.asp, downloaded 19/06/02, p. 1 of 1. 
13 Asia-Europe Foundation website,  http://www.asef.org/main.asp, downloaded 19/06/02, pp. 1-2 of 2. 
14 This is discussed in detail by Michael S. Drake, ‘Representing “Old Countries”: The Strategic Representation of 
Culture as Heritage in the Asia-Europe Summit Meetings’ in Stephanie Lawson (ed.), Europe and the Asia-
Pacific: Culture, Identity and Representations of Region, Richmond, Curzon-Routledge, 2003 (in press). 
15 See ‘The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM): Political Cluster’, EU External Relations website, 
htttp://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/asem/intro/ , downloaded 16/06/02, pp. 1-2 of 2. 
 5  
Meetings on Trade and Investment (SOMTIs); an annual Asia-Europe Business Forum; a ministerial 
conference on Science and Technology; an ad hoc meeting of Ministers of the Environment; and 
another ministerial level conference on Cooperation for the Management of Migratory Flows between 
Europe and Asia.16 And these are just a few of the more prominent meetings. The calendar of events for 
2002 alone consists (at the time of writing) of 46 separate meetings in cities from Beijing to Tampere, 
bearing such titles as ‘ASEM Lifelong Learning’ and ‘ASEM Customs Procedures Working Group’ to 
‘ASEM Workshop on Conservation and Sustainable Use of Forests’, ‘ASEM Young Leaders Seminar’ 
and ‘ASEM 6th Investment Experts Group’.17 In addition to these formal events ASEM has, not 
surprisingly, also given rise to a parallel set of activities and meetings conducted by NGOs.  These 
have been drawn together under their own special acronym – the AEPF or Asia-Europe People’s 
Forum which receives formal funding. However, questions have been raised about whether NGOs have 
received much more than lip-service.18  
 
 With the fourth summit scheduled to meet in Copenhagen in September 2002, ASEM 
watchers will no doubt be looking to see how the agenda is shaping up. For an indication of what might 
be raised, the report from the fourth ASEM Foreign Ministers’ Meeting provides a guide. Among the 
political items listed for summit attention are some fairly obvious ones such as measures to counter 
terrorism as well as other major international security issues to do with the tensions between India and 
Pakistan, security situations in Afghanistan and the Korean peninsular. In addition, international 
criminal activities such as trafficking in drugs, arms and people, money laundering, and so on will be 
on the agenda again. The issue of membership, however, seems to have been side-stepped by deferring 
it until ASEM V.19 Because membership issue is embedded in identity politics, we look at this aspect 
next together with how human rights issues are implicated. 
 
Regionalism and Identity Politics 
The process of regionalization, as well as the establishment of formal inter-regional relations, has 
encouraged much debate about issues of regional identity and membership, including who can rightly 
belong  to both the EU and ASEM. This has become more marked in the post-Cold War period as 
debates about ‘ideology’ have receded while ideas about the role of ‘culture’ as a major dynamic in 
world politics have gained popularity.20 And it is obviously a significant issue with EU enlargement 
firmly on the agenda. With respect to the regions ‘Europe’ and ‘Asia’, these have often been taken to 
                                                           
16 Chairman’s Statement of the Third Asia-Europe Meeting, Seoul, 20-21 October 2000’, EU External Relations 
website, htttp://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/asem/aecf_2000.htm, downloaded 16/06/02, p. 3 of 10. 
17 ‘The ASEM Process: Calendar of Events’, EU External Relations website, 
htttp://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/asem/asem_process/calendar1.htm, downloaded 16/06/02, pp. 1-3 of 
3. 
18 For a discussion of NGO activity in relation to ASEM see Julie Gilson, ‘Making Uncommon Cause: Forging 
Identities on the Margins of ASEM’ in Lawson (ed.), 2003 (in press). 
19 See Fourth ASEM Foreign Ministers Meeting: Chair Statement Madrid, 6-7 June 2002, EU External Relations 
website, htttp://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/asem/min_other_meeting/for_min4.htm, downloaded 
16/06/02, p. 3 of 5. There is a Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs website as well (at 
http://www.u..dk/mutligeemnerUK.asp), but at the time of writing the information on it is extremely sparse 
20 See Stephanie Lawson, ‘Introduction: A New Agenda for International Relations?’ in Stephanie Lawson (ed.), 
The New Agenda for International Relations: From Polarization to Globalization in World Politics?, Cambridge, 
Polity, 2002, pp. 11-14. 
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represent cultural or civilizational areas, each with certain essential, if elusive, characteristics. In turn, 
these are assumed to be the product of centuries old processes of historical evolution – processes which 
are unique and particular and cannot be simply replicated elsewhere. Regionalism based on supposed 
cultural characteristics is more exclusive than regionalism based more on economic or geographic 
criteria. According to Wesley, the latter tend to be supported by those ‘envisioning a more functional 
rationale for the region’ while cultural regionalism, which is perceived to be gaining ascendancy in 
Europe and East Asia, is supported by those concerned with issues of internal cohesion and 
homogeneity and who see these as essential to the prospects of a regional bloc playing a ‘coherent 
international role’.21 As we shall see, this is an important issue for ASEM membership. 
 
In Europe, despite its rather obvious cultural diversity (manifest in religious, linguistic and 
ethnic differences throughout the region), there is nonetheless support for a certain ‘Europeaness’ in 
fundamental socio-cultural terms which underscores a distinctly European identity.22 This is assumed 
to be embedded in a set of shared cultural values and concerns revolving around a political identity that 
is portrayed as modern, rational and secular and which upholds the basic principles underpinning 
human rights and democracy.23 One can argue about how the reality matches up with the ideal, and 
indeed the arguments for the impossibility of a ‘European cultural identity’ are more persuasive than 
those in support. Nonetheless, it can be argued that the EU possesses an official political culture that 
has produced strong support for universal human rights and democratic governance. The basic 
principles are enshrined certain in key instruments and form the basis for many policies, including the 
EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The following statements illustrate some of the 
policy implications for both membership of the EU as well as its external relations: 
 
A considerable step in integrating human rights and democratic principles into the policies of the 
European Union was taken with the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) on 1 
November 1993. The treaty considers as one of the objective of the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy of the European Union the development and consolidation of “democracy and the rule of law, 
and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”. At the same time the new title on 
development cooperation includes a second direct reference to human rights and democratisation: 
“Community policy in this area shall contribute to the general objective of developing and 
consolidating democracy and the rule of law and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.”… 
 
The Treaty of Amsterdam, which came into force on 1 May 1999, marks another significant step 
forward in integrating human rights into the legal order of the European Union. This treaty inserts a 
new article 6 in the Treaty on European Union, which reaffirms that the European Union “is founded 
                                                           
21 Michael Wesley, ‘The Politics of Exclusion: Australia, Turkey and Definitions of Regionalism’, The Pacific 
Review, vol. 10, no. 4, 1997, p. 526. 
22 See, for example, James O’Connell, ‘The Making of Europe: Strengths, Constraints and Resolutions’ in Preston 
King and Andrea Bosco (eds), A Constitution for Europe: A Comparative Study of Federal Constitutions and 
Plans for the United States of Europe, London, Lothian Foundation Press, 1991, p. 25. 
23 Lawson (ed.), Europe and the Asia-Pacific (forthcoming).  
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on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the 
rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States”. Member States violating these 
principles in a ‘serious and persistent’ way run the risk to see (sic) certain of their rights deriving from 
the application of the Union Treaty suspended. …. 
 
The Commission’s actions in the field of external relations will be guided by compliance with the 
rights and principles contained in the EU Charter of Fundamental Right which was officially 
proclaimed at the Nice Summit in December 2000 since this promote coherence between the EU’s 
internal and external approaches.24 
 
 With respect to the moral authority which the EU claims, its document on promoting human 
rights and democratization in third countries states that since all 15 EU member states are democracies 
espousing the same treaty-based principles in their internal and external policies, this ‘gives the EU 
substantial political moral weight’.25 The same document points to the EU’s commitment to the 
abolition of the death penalty not only as a requirement for countries seeking EU membership, but as ‘a 
high profile policy that the EU pursues in international fora and in dialogue with all countries, 
regardless of the nature of the EU’s relationship with them.’26 I mention the death penalty here not only 
as a particular issue for EU membership and enlargement, but for the EU’s identity vis-à-vis other 
members of  ‘the West’, and the US in particular. Interestingly, the US, which has also nurtured an 
identity in international relations as a great protector and promoter of human rights, would not be 
permitted membership of the EU precisely on the grounds that it does not measure up to EU human 
rights standards.  
 
Critical studies in the general field of ethics and foreign policy point to many potential pitfalls 
in attempting to implement any form of ‘ethical foreign policy’ (although it must be noted that this is 
not what the EU has claimed to be doing27). From the perspective of realist international theory, it is a 
case of the road to hell being paved with good intentions. A less generous reading would assert that a 
professed concern with humanitarian issues in the conduct of one’s foreign policy is merely a disguise 
for self-interest. Others also point to the longstanding realist contention that the security and welfare of 
                                                           
24 ‘The EU’s Human Rights & Democratisation Policy’, EU External Relations website, 
htttp://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/human_rights/intro/index/htm, pp. 1-2 of 3. All emphases in the 
original. Note that the document goes on to outline other declarations, including a Declaration on Human Rights 
adopted at the Luxembourg European Council in June 1991 and another resolution on Human Rights, Democracy 
and Development in November 1991 and a further Declaration on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights outlining practical steps to be taken in strengthening the EU’s human 
rights policy. It also outlines measures on human clauses in agreements with third countries and the funding of 
activities to promote human rights, including EuropeAid and provision for funding NGO activities.  
25 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, ‘The European Union’s 
Role in Promoting Human Rights and Democratisation in Third Countries’, COM (2001) 252 final, Brussels, 8 
May 2001, p. 3. 
26 Ibid., p. 16. 
27 See Karen E. Smith, ‘The EU, Human Rights and Relations with Third Countries: ‘Foreign Policy’ with an 
Ethical dimension?’ in Karen E. Smith and Margot Light (eds), Ethics and Foreign Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2001, p. 186. Smith also raises the question of whether the EU can be said to have a foreign 
policy at all, arguing that it does, albeit in a limited sense. I take the view that the term ‘foreign policy’ can just as 
easily be applied to an entity like the EU and not simply to unitary states. 
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their own citizens is the primary responsibility of political leaders and that ‘the luxury of propagating 
their own values’ should not be pursued over and above security interests and commercial 
considerations. Bringing human rights issues into the diplomatic dialogue in fact risks weakening these 
considerations.28 Moreover it is incredibly difficult to maintain a consistent approach to all countries, as 
studies of sanctions and conditionality show.29 Despite all these problems, there is significant support 
for maintaining a principled stand and declining to do business with at least some serious violators of 
human rights even though it carries other diplomatic risks. With respect to ASEAN, the EU has not 
allowed Myanmar (which became a member of ASEAN in 1997) to sign up to an EU-ASEAN 
cooperation agreement, or to participate in ASEM.30 This follows previous problems in the EU-
ASEAN relationship over other human rights issues.31 
 
 What are some of the reasons behind the EU’s very strong domestic and international stance 
on human rights and democratization? Although one can be highly critical of theories based on 
historical determinism – and with very good reason – it is nonetheless fair enough to suggest that some 
of Europe’s shared historical experiences have contributed to the identity that Europe – as represented 
by the EU – has acquired today. It does not require very much insight to recognize that the common 
experience of bitter warfare and some of the worst abuses of human rights ever witnessed have had a 
profound influence on the political development of  Europe over the past 60 years or so.  
 
This experience has not only provided the basis for the EU’s strong official support for 
democratic and rights protective regimes, but also for the weakening of national sovereignty in favour 
of supranational institutions. Portes and Vines note that for the founders of contemporary Europe, who 
created the European Steel and Coal Community in the 1950s, their explicit purpose was to 
internationalize – and therefore immobilize – the primary means of waging war: ‘This lesson was 
connected with a reading of European history which claims that the existence of the nation state is a 
major explanation of Europe’s wars, and a deeply held view that moves to enmesh the nation state in 
wider structures would erect bulwarks against future conflict.’32 In summary, one could argue that it is 
not so much shared practices of ‘civilization’ that has given Europe much of its present unity, but 
rather a history of horrendous warfare and outright barbarity among and between many of its 
constituent members. 
 
                                                           
28 Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler, ‘Blair’s Britain: A Force for Good in the World?’ in Smith and Light (eds), 
Ethics and Foreign Policy, p. 167. 
29 For a study of the EU’s attempts to implement conditionality see Karen Smith, ‘The Use of Political 
Conditionality in the EU’s Relations with Third Countries: How Effective?’, European Foreign Affairs 
Review,vol. 3, issue 2, 1998, pp. 253-274.  
30 Ibid., p. 271. 
31 See Joseph A. McMahon, ‘ASEAN and the Asia-Europe Meeting: Strengthening the European Union’s 
Relationship with Southeast Asia?’, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 3, issue 2, 1998, p. 234. 
32 Richard Portes and David Vines, ‘European Integration: Retrospect and Prospect’ in Peter Drysdale and David 
Vines (eds), Europe, East Asia and APEC: A Shared Global Agenda?, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1998, p. 79. 
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This contrasts with views of Europe that represent it as ‘the fount of wisdom and educator of 
the world through ‘modern’ and ‘western’ civilization’.33 In terms of its implicit claims to superiority 
over the rest of the world, this ethnocentric view has been described as ‘offensive’, and with good 
reason. It certainly ignores the wealth of the contributions made to ‘Western civilization’ by transfers 
of technology and learning from different parts of the world, and especially from the Asia that stretches 
from Turkey and the Middle East through the Indian sub-continent, and across to Japan.  
 
 Turning to the Asian region, one is hard-pressed to identify shared ‘cultural’ or ‘civilizational’ 
characteristics here as well. It is often remarked, even by the proponents of ‘Asian values’, that the 
cultural heterogeneity of the region as a whole surpasses all others. Even the more limited area of 
‘Pacific Asia’34 within which the current membership of ASEM is located is extremely diverse. 
Nonetheless, it is claimed that there is a certain cultural bond, especially among societies described as 
‘Confucian’, that has given rise to a common and unique set of values that are qualitatively different 
from those of Europe or ‘the West’. Indeed, exactly this argument has been put by Tommy Koh in his 
capacity as Executive Director of  ASEF on the occasion of a debate over human rights.35  
 
Volumes have been written both for and against the idea of ‘Asian values’, and although the 
subject has been canvassed exhaustively, it never seems to run entirely out of steam. An implicit notion 
of ‘Asian values’ has certainly underscored the identity of ‘Asia’ as a participant in the ASEM process. 
Moreover, the kind of values that have figured prominently in the debate, such as community before 
self, consensus rather than dissent, respect for authority, and so on, have been constructed explicitly in 
opposition to the values said to characterize Europe and ‘the West’. In other words, the Asia defined by 
the Asian values debate consists very largely of a negation of what are assumed to be European (or 
more generally ‘Western’) values.  
 
These issues aside, just as one can point to a set of historical experiences in Europe that 
produced  a post-war political consensus, one can identify shared experiences in the Asian region that 
are relevant to the present discussion, although they cannot be said to have necessarily produced the 
same kind of political consensus.  
One significant experience that most Asian countries have shared, and which has a profound influence 
on issues of identity in the present, is that of colonization by European powers.36 Without going over a 
great deal of fairly obvious ground in relation to this point, it can be argued that the memory of the 
                                                           
33 Michael Wintle, ‘Cultural Identity in Europe: Shared Experience’ in Michale Wintle (ed.), Culture and Identity 
in Europe: Perceptions of Divergence and Unity in Past and Present, Aldershot, Avebury, 1996, p. 11. 
34 Pacific Asia comprises the sub-region which includes the area covered by the countries of Southeast Asia as 
well as China, Japan and the Korean peninsular. 
35 Tommy Koh, ‘Differences in Asian and European Values’, Speech to the 2nd Informal ASEM Seminar on 
Human Rights, Beijing, 27 June 1998, Asia-Europe Foundation website,  
http://www.asef.org/documents/speech_june27_tommykoh_99.html, downloaded 19/06/02, p. 1 of 3. Note that 
despite the reference to ‘Europe’ in the title of the speech, he talks almost exclusively about ‘the West’. 
36 There was also an experience of Japanese colonialism and occupation which introduces another dimension to 
historical experiences in the region, but which cannot be pursued here. Suffice to say that Japan, for this and other 
reasons – including an obsession among some Japanese with their absolute ‘uniqueness’, as well as significant 
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colonial period sustains a continuing resentment against ‘Europe’, which is partly manifest in the 
‘Asian values’ debate as well as the broader phenomenon of ‘Asianism’.37 It is also evident in an 
exaggerated commitment to the doctrine of state sovereignty as a symbol of national independence and 
international stature. The resentment is further manifest in a form of postcolonial discourse fuelled by a 
perception that ‘Europe’ has maintained a posture of superiority long after the end of formal 
colonialism. This includes a posture of moral superiority in relation to issues such as human rights. 
Koh’s speech on ‘Differences in Asian and European Values’ illustrate some of these points. 
 
… the West has not yet come to accept Asia as an equal. The West has dominated Asia for the major 
part of the past two hundred years. Most people in the West, including its intellectuals, still regard Asia 
and Asians as inferior.  …. I suspect that the West cannot accept the concept of Asian values because 
the latter could pose a challenge to Western intellectual hegemony. The truth is that we still live in a 
world which is economically, culturally, intellectually and morally dominated by the West. Of all the 
regions in the non-Western world, only East Asia has the potential to achieve parity with the West. By 
1995, the ten major economies of East Asia were, collectively, as large as the United States (25% of the 
world economy) and only slightly smaller than the European Union (25%). East Asia is also the home 
of some of the world’s oldest and richest civilizations. Therefore, East Asia has the potential to 
challenge … Western domination in the economic, cultural, intellectual and moral spheres, in the 21st 
Century.38 
 
 One of the most outspoken political leaders on the Asian side of the ASEM process on these 
issues is undoubtedly Malaysia’s Prime Minster, Dr Mahathir who has rarely been shy in voicing his 
opinions about the perceived arrogance of Europeans – especially the British (Malaysia’s former 
colonizers) – as well as that of  Europe’s main ‘outpost’ in the region, Australia. Mahathir’s hostility to 
Australia in general, and his opposition to Australian membership of ASEM in particular, is well-
documented. In a statement which illustrates his adherence to cultural regionalism, Mahathir has gone 
so far as to state that if Australia wanted ASEM membership, it would have to join on the European 
side. Even if this wasn’t quite ludicrous from a geographical and economic point of view, Australia’s 
relations with the EU are very under-developed.39 Mahathir’s stance is directly related to what he sees 
as Australia’s ‘cultural’ difference vis-à-vis its Asian neighbours with racial difference sometimes 
being invoked as well.40 Mahathir has gone so far as to state that to admit Australia to East Asian 
regional meetings would like the EU admitting Arabs.41 More generally, Mahathir is renowned for a 
                                                                                                                                                                      
ambivalences about its own regional belonging and its inclusion as a member of  ‘the West’ in some cases – has 
problems in its historical relationship with other ASEM members. 
37 See Stephanie Lawson, ‘Perspectives on the Study of Culture and International Politics: From Nihonjinron to the 
New Asianism’, Asia-Pacific Review, vol. 6, no. 2, November 1999, pp. 24-41. 
38 Koh, ‘Differences’, p. 1 of 3. 
39 For a recent discussion of Australia’s relations with the EU, see Philomena Murray, ‘Problems of Symmetry and 
Summitry in the EU-Australia Relationship’ in Stephanie Lawson (ed), forthcoming. 
40 See Wesley, ‘Politics of Exclusion’, p. 540. For another analysis of the Malaysia-Australia relationship that 
explores a number of other societal factors see Shamsul A.B., ‘Australia in Contemporary Australia’s Worldview’ 
in Z. Marshallay (ed.), Australia-Malaysia Relations: The Way Ahead, Clayton (Vic.), Monash Asian Institute, 
1996, pp. 46-73. 
41 Baker quoted ibid., p. 539. 
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Europhobia that even some of his conservative neighbours believe goes too far.  He has also been 
unrepentant in claiming that the Asian economic crisis was the result of a ‘Western conspiracy’.42  
 
Some of Mahathir’s statements in relation to Europe and Australia range from comical to 
racist. But the extent to which he has pushed cultural regionalism has been mirrored on the European 
side – as Wesley’s study has shown.43 Looking back a little further, it should also be remembered that 
one of Jean Monnet’s motives in promoting European integration was a fear that Europe’s role in the 
very civilization that it had created  was declining. And successors such as Jacques Delors were 
committed to regional cultural homogeneity as a means of maintaining unity.44 Another point to 
consider is that those who focus on postures of superiority among Europeans at large, miss some of the 
interesting points of friction within the EU. Britain, for example, is notorious for harbouring significant 
numbers of Europhobes within its ranks. In addition, British attitudes have, at least in the perceptions 
of their neighbours, verged on the insufferable: ‘Through a long period of imperialism and hegemony, 
British people had developed a sense of their uniqueness that bordered on condescension to other 
peoples … [which] was particularly pronounced in the attitudes to France and Germany. …’45 The 
same commentators go on to suggest that such attitudes, which translate into ‘cultural factors’, made 
Britain ill-suited for participation in the early experiments in European integration, and still form ‘a 
cultural barrier’ between Britain and the rest of Europe. This is related to a concern with defending 
national sovereignty, which is interesting insofar as it is comparable to attitudes in the Asian region.46 
 
One of the issues concerning ASEM membership and human rights relates to Myanmar, a 
country with one of the poorest records in the Southeast Asian region. In 1997, ASEAN admitted 
Vietnam, Laos and Mynamar to its membership, and Cambodia joined two years later. This did not 
automatically mean that they would be included in the membership of ASEM. In the lead-up to ASEM 
II, however, it became an issue because it was well-known that the EU would be unlikely to 
countenance an official relationship with Myanmar, especially since it had imposed stricter diplomatic 
sanctions in 1996 due to continuing human rights violations as well as Myanmar’s failure to curb the 
drug trade. When confronted with the exclusion of Myanmar from the second ASEM summit it was, 
not unexpectedly, Mahathir who claimed that this amounted to discrimination against ASEAN and 
suggested that ASEAN members may decide to boycott the meeting as a result.47 Other ASEAN 
members such as Indonesia, however, did not support the automatic inclusion of those acceding to 
ASEAN in the ASEM process precisely for the negative impact that this was likely to have on ASEM, 
especially given that the Myanmar issue had already stalled the ASEAN-EU dialogue.48 
                                                           
42 Ole Bruun and Michael Jacobsen, ‘Introduction’ in Michael Jacobsen and Ole Bruun (eds), Human Rights and 
Asian Values: Contesting National Identities and Cultural Representations in Asia, Richmond, Curzon Press, 
2000, p. 17. 
43 Wesley, ‘Politics of Exclusion’. 
44 Ibid., pp. 538-39. 
45 Stephen George and Ian Bache, ‘Politics in the European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 182. 
46 Ibid., p. 182. The authors note that France has also made sovereignty an issue at times. 
47 Luz Baguioro, ‘Myanmar in ASEM no Formal Position Yet, Straights Times, 3 September 1997. 
48 Yeo Lay Hwee, ‘ASEM: Looking Back, Looking Forward’ in Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of 
International and Straegic Affairs, vol. 22, issue 1, April 2000, online version at http://ehostweb9.epnet.com, 
downloaded 16/06/02, p. 14 of 29. 
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Given these developments, it was thought that human rights and ASEM membership may 
become an issue for ASEM II. But this was not to be. Understandably, there was a strong focus on 
financial/economic issues following the 1997/8 financial crisis in the Asian region. However, this did 
not mean that there was insifficient space for the discussion of other issues. According to one report, 
the meeting had simply ‘glossed over’ issues such as membership enlargement, human rights and good 
governance. On the question of membership, this was due to ‘lack of consensus’. It was further 
reported that some ASEM members were keen to include Australia, New Zealand, India and Pakistan 
not simply because they had previously expressed a desire to join, but because of their importance to 
the region, while the European  ‘side’ was keen to deal with the ‘whole’ of Asia and not just Southeast 
and East Asia.49  
 
A perspective offered by another commentator on how human rights issues were broached in 
ASEM II interpreted the lack of substantive debate on the subject quite differently. Describing the 
meeting as being ‘refreshing free’ of a ‘spiral of hubris’, Segal maintained that the earlier ASEM 
agenda had been characterized by a ‘destructive debate between those who argued there were unique 
and immortal Asian values and those who hectored Asians about their authoritarian values.’ The 
second summit, he argued, showed that ‘Asians and Europeans increasingly recognize that while there 
are distinctive values in parts of Asia and Europe, there are no immutable Asian or European values.’50  
 
It is doubtful, however, whether most participants in ASEM really have moved beyond the 
kind of simplistic culturalist paradigm that takes basic values as very difficult to change, if not 
completely immutable. For example, the first informal ASEM symposium on human rights concluded 
rather lamely that although the universality of human rights is accepted, there may nonetheless ‘be 
different ways of implementing these rights in different cultures’.51 In ‘Asian values-speak’ statements 
like this mean that human rights advocates can go on about universality until the proverbial cows come 
home – it can always be qualified by the ‘cultural difference’ (read cultural relativist) argument. 
 
When ASEM III met in Seoul in 2000, the Chair’s official statement simply noted that: 
‘Leaders committed themselves to promote and protect all human rights, including the right to 
development, and fundamental freedoms, bearing in mind their universal, indivisible and 
interdependent character as expressed at the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna.’52 There 
had, however, been tensions in some of the discussions. One was over the possible establishment of 
diplomatic relations with North Korea by European countries, a move which saw some divisions 
                                                           
49 Anonymous, ‘Europe Must Match Deeds with Words’, The Nation’, 6 April 1998 at 
http://www.asef.org/documents/article_april6_deeds_98.html, downloaded 16/06/02, pp. 1-2 of 2.  
50 Gerald Segal, ‘A New ASEM Agenda: A Report on the British Council’s Meeting “Asia and Europe: Societies 
in Transition” 19-22 March 1998’, The Pacific Review, vol. 11, no. 4, 1998, p. 565. 
51 ‘Informal ASEM Symposia on Human Rights and the Rule of Law’ (Lund, 11-13 December 1997), EU External 
Relations website, htttp://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/asem/asem/cluster/ 
pol.htm, downloaded 16/06/02, p. 1 of 3. 
52 ‘The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM): Overview’, EU External Relations website, 
htttp://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/asem/aecf_2000.htm, downloaded 16/06/02, pp. 1 of 2 
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emerge, not down the Asia/Europe divide this time, but among the Europeans. This occurred when 
French leader Chirac indicated that he would not go down the road of formal relations with North 
Korea – an idea that some other European countries had apparently entertained.53  
 
Nonetheless, the almost inevitable Asia/Europe split on attitudes to general  human rights 
issues surfaced again as well. One South Korean official was reported as remarking that on the subject 
of human rights there continued to be ‘two schools of thought – one from Europe and one from Asia’. 
It was further reported that ‘the Europeans … wanted to have human rights a central issue on regional 
security, including North Korea, while the Asians preferred to gloss over the subject.’54 Interestingly, 
on the very same day that ASEM III officially opened in Seoul, the authorities in Myanmar released a 
British human rights activist. One report suggested that it was not so much Western or British pressure 
that had prompted Myanmar’s action, but pressure brought to bear from other ASEAN members ‘who 
have grown increasingly exasperated by the impact of world anger at Myanmar on their hopes of 
expanding trade and international influence.’55 
 
 ASEM III also saw a great deal more NGO activity, with a well-attended People’s Forum 
being held just before the leader’s Summit. Gilson reports that the key themes here were ‘economic, 
social, cultural, civil and political rights according to international human rights and humanitarian law; 
environmentally, socially, economically sustainable patterns of development; greater economic and 
social equity and justice including equality between men and women; and the active participation of 
civil society organisations at ASEM.’ 56 At this level, then, there was clearly plenty of debate about 
human rights issues , although this clearly does not impact on political aspects of the membership 
issue.57 
 
As mentioned earlier, it seems that it has already been decided to defer consideration of 
membership issues for at least two more years. This was made fairly clear in the report from the Fourth 
ASEM Ministers’ conference held in June 2002 which noted two things in particular. First, the meeting 
‘welcomed the positive developments in the Union of Mynamar, in particular the release of Aung San 
Suu Kyi, and looked forward to further positive and concrete steps towards \national reconciliation.’ 
And second, with respect to the issue of membership, the meeting 
 
… welcomed the interest in joining, expressed by various European and Asian states, in particular the 
ASEAN members Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, and agreed to recommend to Leaders to take up the 
                                                           
53 Don Kirk, ‘Korea Talks Produce Discord: Chirac at Odds With EU Leaders on Rights in North’, International 
Herald Tribune, 21-22 October 2000, p. 7. 
54 Ibid. 
55 ‘British Activist Arrives Home from Myanmar, Says His Campaign for Democracy Will Go On’, Taiwan News, 
22 October 2000, p. 5. 
56 Quoted in Julie Gilson, ‘Making Uncommon Cause: Forging Identities on the Margins of ASEM’ in Lawson 
(ed.), 2003 (in press). 
57 Gilson’s chapter (ibid.), also raises some interesting questions of identity in relations to NGOs. 
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issue of enlargement … at the fifth Summit in Hanoi in 2004, to allow consolidation of the ASEM 
process.58 
 
 Given that the agenda is reasonably flexible, however, there is still the possibility that 
membership issues will be the subject of at least preliminary discussion in Copenhagen.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that one question raised early in the whole ASEM process that 
remains unresolved is: ‘with which Asia should Europe conduct dialogue?’59. One could also ask the 
same question about ‘which Europe’ but, for the time being at least, ASEM dialogue is affected much 
more by the former question. In considering this question, I suggest that two related issues will ensure 
that the forces of cultural regionalism (in which ‘political regionalism’ is presently subsumed) continue 
to prevent developments in regional identity along geographic and economic lines, thereby limiting 
membership of ‘Asia’ in the ASEM process. The first is the human rights issue, and this issue has 
several dimensions.  
 
The EU is unlikely to accept Myanmar as part of the ASEM dialogue while ever its human 
rights record remains so obviously wretched. In this respect, the EU does have influence, not so much 
in determining what Asia is in an existential sense, but in terms of an Asia that it is willing to do 
business with. The desire to play more of a role on the world stage (itself an identity issue) might 
nudge the core membership of ASEAN component of ‘Asia’ to place further diplomatic pressure on the 
regime in Myanmar, although this is unlikely to be carried out in any public way. 
 
Human rights issues are implicated in particular versions of what constitutes Asian identity in 
another way as well. The stance taken by Malaysia in relation to both Myanmar and Australia, as 
discussed above, illustrate this. As we have seen, the Malaysian position (at least as represented by 
Mahathir) is that the EU has no business dictating to countries in the Asian region with respect to their 
human rights practices. We have also seen that Australia’s position vis-à-vis Malaysia and other 
‘authentically’ Asian countries is regarded by Mahathir as one which simply assumes a European 
perspective – a perspective which embodies a continuation of Eurocentric and colonial attitudes of 
superiority towards what are now equal sovereign states. For this reason, Malaysia is likely to maintain 
a veto over admitting both Australia and New Zealand in the forseeable future.  
 
More generally, it is difficult to see how the ASEM process is going to move beyond the 
formula of cultural regionalism. As Gilson suggests, ASEM is an explicitly inter-regional dialogue that 
not only posits an ‘Asia’ grouping alongside a ‘European’ one, but also engages in a form of exchange 
that is constantly portrayed as a ‘dialogue of difference’, not least with respect to issues such as human 
                                                           
58 Fourth ASEM Foreign Ministers Meeting: Chair Statement Madrid, 6-7 June 2002, EU External Relations 
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rights.60 All this seems to confirm Huntington’s approach to the role of ‘civilizations’ in world politics 
in the post-Cold War period in general, noting that he specifically promotes the view that ‘the extent to 
which countries observe human rights corresponds overwhelmingly with divisions among 
civilizations’.61 This represents a conservative/relativist view of the role cultural factors in international 
order which has become deeply embedded in the contemporary politics of regional identity and which 
is likely to significantly influence the evolution of ASEM for the foreseeable future. There seems to be 
very little likelihood, however, of the ASEM process actually unravelling over issues of human rights 
and membership – Mahathir’s antics notwithstanding. The original economic imperatives as well as the 
momentum gained through the proliferation of ASEM-related activities should ensure that it continues 
to develop as a key inter-regional institution in the twenty-first century. 
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